Michigan Law Review
Volume 58

Issue 5

1960

Bankruptcy - Uniform Trust Receipts Act - Rights of Entruster to a
Lien Interest in the General Assets of Bankrupt Trustee
Barry I. Fredericks
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and the Secured Transactions
Commons

Recommended Citation
Barry I. Fredericks, Bankruptcy - Uniform Trust Receipts Act - Rights of Entruster to a Lien Interest in the
General Assets of Bankrupt Trustee, 58 MICH. L. REV. 783 (1960).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol58/iss5/8

This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

1960]

RECENT DECISIONS

783

BANKRUPTCY-UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPTS ACT-RIGHTS OF ENTRUSTER TO
LmN INTEREST IN THE GENERAL AssETs OF BANKRUPT TRUSTEE-Plaintiff,
a credit corporation, used a trust receipt arrangement to finance a car
dealer, who thereafter sold a number of the entrusted cars (out of trust
sales) without remitting the proceeds to plaintiff. In order to restore some
of these proceeds, which had been dissipated in the course of running
his business, the car dealer gave plaintiff a trust receipt on ten unencumbered trucks in its possession, in release of part of plaintiff's security
interest under the first trust receipts. Plaintiff later sold these ten trucks.
Subsequently, in the course of bankruptcy proceedings filed against the
car dealer, plaintiff sought to assert a prior lien on the bankrupt's general
assets to recover the value of the dissipated proceeds from the original
out of trust sales, minus the value it sought to retain from the sale of
the ten trucks. On appeal from an order denying plaintiff's claim, held,
affirmed. A trust receipt gives no lien interest in the proceeds of out of
trust sales under section l 75 of the Illinois Trust Receipts Act.l The
act creates merely a priority interest in an entruster as to proceeds, which
is denied preferential status under the Bankruptcy Act. 2 Furthermore,
because the second trust receipt covering the ten trucks was given for the
release of such a priority interest, it constituted a transfer of property
for an antecedent debt within the prohibition of section 60a of the Bankruptcy Act.3 In the Matter of Crosstown Motors, Inc., (7th Cir. 1959)
272 F. (2d) 224-.
One of the fundamental purposes of the trust receipt, under the widely adopted Uniform Trust Receipts Act,4 is to provide lenders of certain types of short term credit with a predominant security interest5 that
will afford protection against most other types of creditors in cases of

A

l " • • . the entruster shall be entitled, to the extent to which and as against all classes
of persons as to whom his security interest was valid at the time of disposition by the
trustee, as follows . . • (b) to any proceed or value of any proceeds (whether such proceeds are identifiable or not) of the goods, documents or instruments, if said proceeds
were received by the trustee within ten days prior to ••• the filing of a petition in bankruptcy. . . •" Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 121½, §175; UTRA, §10, 9C U.L.A. 220. The
Illinois Trust Receipts Act is an incorporation into the laws of Illinois, with some minor
changes, none of which have any bearing on the principal case, of the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 121½, §§166-187; 9C U.L.A. 220.
2 52 Stat. 840 (1938), as amended by 66 Stat. 426 (1952), 11 U.S.C. (1958) §104
(Chandler Act); Strom v. Piekes, (2d Cir. 1941) 123 F. (2d) 1003. See note, 66 YALE L. J.
567 (1957). See, generally, Hanna, "Preferences as Affected by Section 60c and 67b of
Bankruptcy Law," 25 WASH. L. REv. l (1950).
3 30 Stat. 544, c. VI, §60 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. (1958) §96. See note 17 infra.
4 UTRA, 9C U.L.A. 220. This act has now been adopted in 35 states, according to
9C UL.A. (1957; Supp. 1959) at 59.
5 See Commercial Credit Corp. v. Horan, 325 Ill. App. 625, 60 N.E. (2d) 763 (1945);
Donn v. Auto Dealers Investment Co., 385 Ill. 211, 52 N.E. (2d) 695 (1944); Commercial
Discount Co. v. Los Angeles County, 16 Cal. (2d) 158, 105 P. (2d) 115 (1940); General
Finance Corp. v. Krause Motor Sales, 302 Ill. App. 210, 23 N.E. (2d) 781 (1939). See
Bogert, "Effect of Uniform Trust Receipts Act," 3 UNrv. CHr. L. REv. 26 (1935).
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the debtor's insolvency.6 Unfortunately, because of the varying language
used in the act, it is not explicit whether the denominated "security interest" was to be in the nature -of a lien or merely to provide a priority
interest.7 Since the passage of the Chandler Amendment to the Bankruptcy Act in 1938, state-created priorities, but not state-created liens,
are refused preference in bankruptcy proceedings.a Consequently, the
determination of the exact nature of the trust receipt security interest
under state interpretations has become an issue of crucial importance to
the entruster. Prior Illinois decisions have consistently held that the
trust receipt, under the Illinois Trust Receipts Act, creates in the entruster a lien interest in the entrusted goods.9 The Illinois courts have
not yet faced the problem of deciding whether this type of lien extends
to the proceeds of out-of-trust sales; but from the basic nature of the
trust receipt transaction, which anticipates a sale of the entrusted goods,
it would seem reasonable that the lien interest afforded the entruster
should extend at least as far as the identifiable proceeds from the outof-trust sales.1 0 If this hurdle can successfully be cleared there is no
6 The only type of lien which can be perfected against the interest of the entruster is
a special statutory lien. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) §176; UTRA, §11, 9C U.L.A. 220 at 263.
"Special liens arising out of contractual acts of the trustee with reference to the processing, warehousing, shipping or otherwise dealing with specific goods in the usual course
of the trustee's business preparatory to their sale shall attach against the interest of the
entruster in said goods as well as against the interest of the trustee. . . :• See, generally,
comment, 49 MICH. L. R.Ev. 243 at 248 (1950), where, in discussing the effect of such a lien
on the entruster's interest in a bankruptcy proceeding as affected by §60a of the Bankruptcy Act, the author states: "The primary rule is that a transfer shall be deemed to
have been made at the time when it became so far perfected that no one subsequently
acquiring a lien on the property transferred would thereby acquire rights therein superior to those of the transferee. This is the test to be applied to all property other than
realty. A further limitation is found in the stipulation that the lien which is to be
used as the test of perfection is such as is obtainable 'by legal or equitable proceedings on a
simple contract. . . : This provision excludes the possibility of a challenge on the basis
of hypothetical statutory liens granted special priority by the applicable state law. These
statutory liens are expressly excluded in the definitions of a lien contained i)l the section."
1 A lien is a right independent of bankruptcy and is a charge against assets which must
be met before distribution to unsecured creditors. A priority is a creature of the Bankruptcy Act and is an unsecured claim over other claims in the distribution of the bankrupt's remaining assets. 3 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, Moore ed., 1f64.02, pp. 2054-2055 (1941).
8 See note 2 supra. The statute was intended only to affect those rights which were
acquired under an equitable or common law lien, as opposed to statutory lien. See note
6 supra. See also 4 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, Moore ed., 1f1f67.12, 67.20 et seq. See, generally,
Hanna, "Preferences as Affected by Section 60c and 70b of Bankruptcy Law," 25 WASH.
L. R.Ev. I (1950).
9 "Under the terms of the Act where the trustee (borrower) has in his possession
goods which are the subject matter of the trust receipt transaction and retains same in his
possession, the security interest or lien of the entruster (lender) attaches to such goods
when the trust receipt is executed. . . .'' Commercial Credit Corp. v. Horan, note 5
supra, at 628; Donn v. Auto Dealers Investment Co., note 5 supra; General Finance Corp.
v. Krause Motor Sales, note 5 supra.
10 See, e.g., A.L.I., Uniform Commercial Code, §9-306, p. 652 at 654 where it is stated:
"Whether a debtor's sale of collateral was authorized or unauthorized, prior law [referring to §10 of the UTRA] generally gave the secured party a claim to the proceeds." See
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interpretative problem in extending the entruster's interest beyond identifiable proceeds to the debtor's general assets.11 Section 175 expressly
states that the entruster's interest is valid as " ... to any proceed or value
of any proceeds (whether such proceeds are identifiable or not) of the
goods. . . ."1 2 But the court in the principal case, without express
reference to any Illinois decisions, found (1) because §175 of the act
contains the word "priority" rather than "lien" and, (2) since the act
was enactecJ before state-created priorities were cut off in bankruptcy
proceedings, that the drafters of the act actually intended to give the
entruster a priority interest rather than a lien interest.1 3 The second of
these points, however, in fact presents a sound basis for explaining away
the use of the word priority when a lien interest was intended.14 And
this conclusion is further buttressed by the expressed intent of the drafters of the Uniform Trust Receipts Actl5 and by Illinois decisions1 6 which
indicate the trend of the state law. Since the drafters intended that the
entruster should receive a lien interest the court has failed to interpret
the statute with reasonable insight into the purpose underlying its
enactment.
Finally, the result that the second trust receipt, covering the ten trucks,
constitutes a voidable preference under the Bankruptcy Act, section 60a
is plausible only upon acceptance of the court's determination that a
trust receipt transaction affords a mere priority interest to the entruster.17
also authorities cited in note 11 infra, where a majority of cases facing the problem have
allowed a lien interest to attach to the proceeds.
11 This problem has been considered in other jurisdictions, which have held that a
lien interest created under a trust receipt transaction extends to the general assets of the
trustee. Commercial Union Bank of Nashville v. Alexander, (Tenn. App. 1958) 312 S.W.
(2d) 611; In re Harpeth Motors, (D.C. Tenn. 1955) 135 F. Supp. 863; Universal Credit
Corp. v. Citizen State Bank, 224 Ind. I, 64 N.E. (2d) 28 (1945). See Bogert; "Effect of
Uniform Trust Receipts Act," 3 UNIV. CHI. L. R.Ev. 26 (1935); Hendl, "Trust Receipt
Financing," 26 CHI•KENT L. REv. 197 (1948).
12 See note I supra.
13 See principal case at 226.
14 That is to say if the court recognizes that the drafters intended to give the entruster
the equivalent of a lien interest, despite the use of the word priority, then the court should
have given weight to such intent.
15 "In the event of the trustee's insolvency, it [referring to the UTRA] simplifies the
proof in administration proceedings by allowing a preference for any proceeds of released
security which have been received by the trustee within ten days, so far as the trustee
was under a duty to account for such proceeds." HANDBOOK, NAT. CONF. OF COMMRS. ON
UNIFORM STATE LAw 251 (1933); 9C U.L.A. 225 (1957).
16 See note 9 supra.
17 The court, principal case at 227, accepts Commercial's contention that the second
trust receipt was given in release of the prior trust receipt. In view of the court's con•
struction of the interests created by the first trust receipt it rightly concludes that the
transaction is a voidable preference under §60a of the Bankrupcty Act, note 3 supra. However, accepting the contention that the trust receipt creates a valid lien interest in the
debtor's general assets, §60a does not apply. To constitute a voidable preference the
bank must dispose of property so as to diminish the estate against which his creditors can
claim; a transfer of proceeds to which the bankrupt is not entitled does not have such
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The co:urt's failure to interpret the word priority in the context apparently intended by the drafters of the act results in the serious impairment of the trust receipt as a mode of commercial security and seems
to place a greater weight on semantics than on reality.

Barry I. Fredericks

an effect and therefore is not a preferential transfer. In re Loring, (D.C. Mass. 1939) 30
F. Supp. 758; Bielaski v. Nat. City Bank of New York, (2d Cir. 1934) 68 F. (2d) 723;
Crosby v. Sproul, (D.C. Mass. 1927) 17 F. (2d) 325, affd. sub nom. Crosby v. Packer,
(1st Cir. 1929) 22 F. (2d) 611; Nat. Bank of Newport, N.Y. v. Nat. Herkimer County
Bank of Little Falls, 225 U.S. 178 (1912); Western Tie&: Timber Co. v. Brown, 196 U.S.
502 (1905). The transfer of a second lien interest to the entruster for a release of a prior
valid lien interest does not deprive the bankrupt's estate of any assets, against which his
creditors can claim; hence, the transaction lies outside the thrust of §60a of the Bankruptcy Act. Cf. Walker v. Clinton State Bank, (8th Cir. 1954) 216 F. (2d) 165; Pearson
v. Rapstine, (5th Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 313.

